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Critics of the July 23 revolution and Gamal Abdel Nasser tend to regard the June 1967 setback as the only entry point to assessing the entire performance of the Nasser regime over eighteen years, and taking it as evidence of the failure of the national and national goals for which the revolution came.
In dealing with this setback, I do not want to underestimate the size of the loss suffered by the country as a result of the military defeat, nor do I deny that there has been a deficiency that has already occurred on the part of more than one side, but only I will try to put this event in its correct position from my point of view in the context of Egyptian political development In general, the performance of the revolution and the experience of Gamal Abdel Nasser in particular.
Any experience of the magnitude of the human experience of Nasiriyah cannot be expected to continue without errors or deviations, as we are finally dealing with human beings who mistake and injure, and these errors were not to the degree that covers the scale of the achievements of the revolution over eighteen years, but at the same time it was The subject of monitoring external forces, which were constantly searching for gaps to escape from them to strike Nasiriyah as much as the latter posed from a source of constant annoyance and threat to all international powers that have influence in the Middle East region, or those regional powers, who see the Nasserist nationalist unitary project as a hitting of their goals and obstruction For its plans, but rather a threat to the survival of these forces in the chairs of government, or even as a political force on the Arab political scene.
President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced, in his resignation speech that he broadcast on the evening of June 9, 1967, that he bears full responsibility for what happened and his decision to withdraw from the leadership position to join the ranks of the people to start a new struggle phase to rid the country of the occupation, but the people refused to accept the absence of Gamal Abdel Nasser . Perhaps it was the first time that the Egyptian political street interfered with all its variations, and in circumstances of such a setback, to force the political leadership to change its decision, and return to the position of responsibility until the effects of the aggression were completely removed.
Despite what was represented by the renewal of the mandate for Abdel Nasser to lead the new stage, reaching the goal of ending the effects of the Israeli aggression, it was in no way meant to ignore the reasons that led to this situation, and it was not a blank mandate, despite the role played by external factors in managing aggression and access With this tragic picture, President Gamal Abdel Nasser did not want to ignore the influence of the internal factors that helped the success of the measure, and he practiced a unique model of self-criticism, not for the purpose of flogging the self but rather in pursuit of reform as much as its energy.
The three years, which separated the occurrence of the setback in June 1967 and the departure of President Gamal Abdel Nasser on September 28, 1970, were an expression of the extent of the change in thought and style in the performance of political leadership and the depth of its absorption of the limits of the mandate, which it obtained from the people on 9 and 10 June 1967, But this expression was not attached to the basic principles of the July 23, 1952 revolution, or to the fundamentals of the Nasser project in any way.
The national trend, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, and after he defined his goals in the early fifties, which is to reject dependency of any kind, and work to build a system of Arab security based on Arab self-capabilities, receives responses similar to the huge cries, which reject backwardness and injustice on the one hand and contain On the other hand, any reactions refusing on the public level. The huge victory achieved by this trend in the Battle of the Baghdad Pact, then in the face of the tripartite aggression and the battle to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956, paved the way for the Egyptian-Syrian unity, then the Iraq revolution in July 1958, and combined these two. The two accomplishments with sharp confrontations with the Eisenhower project to fill the void in the region, and a similar confrontation with the Soviet Union, which tried in a period of periods to translate the development in political, military and economic relations with Egypt and the region into a position in favor of the Communists and their parties, and then a battle erupted between Cairo and Baghdad, and reached a point The political break between the two countries.
Then came the Yemeni revolution on September 26, 1926, to radically change the scales, the independence of Algeria in 1962, and its emergence as an added force to revolutionary action and revolutionary changes in both Syria and Iraq in February and March 1963.
It can be said that the national trend led by Abdel Nasser was dominated by the belief in the cause of Arab nationalism as a reality and one of the foundations of our lives, he was aware of the experience and lessons learned from it for the future, as it was a belief that was not lacking the ability to challenge difficulties and confront crises, even if they were sudden As it happened after the separation or in the direct clash with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after the Yemen revolution. Or the confrontations that took place with the Shah of Iran, after establishing his full diplomatic relations with Israel or the severe crisis that occurred in Arab-German relations in 1965, which resulted in the severing of diplomatic relations between the majority of Arab countries and West Germany due to the latter’s relations with Israel.
After absorbing these facts, Israel and the West have sought to search for different approaches to deal with the national trend, so that focus is placed on them in public and in secret, and the drag of the Nasserist leadership to become gradually involved in more crises and confrontations. These approaches were as follows:
■ External plotting: In fact, the dimensions of external plotting no longer need proof, for the thirty years that have passed since the setback occurred many indications of Israeli-American collusion in particular, other than other Western collusion that the curtain has not completely removed until today – we have The goals of the two sides met to strike Egypt in order to secure long-term strategic plans from their point of view.
Global Zionism found in the July revolution, and the decisions it took over the entire 1950s to disrupt its expansionist projects, which were carefully prepared since the end of the 19th century, and successive American administrations in Egypt’s challenge to the revolution for Western hegemony projects in the Middle East found a disturbance of balance Internationalism, which sought to consolidate it in the aftermath of the Second World War, as Egypt’s support for liberation movements in Africa and the third world in general, and the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement, has been a source of inconvenience to decision makers in Washington constantly, and perhaps the most influential factor in all of this is the consensus that It occurred between these Israeli and American positions on the one hand and the plans of some of the existing political systems in the region at the time, which felt the danger of the national tide led by Cairo on its security and its future in general, and then provided undeniable support in the success of the external measure.
Attempts by the regional and international sides to prepare to strike Egypt began immediately after the triple aggression of 1956 and the withdrawal of the aggressor forces, as they followed various and different ways in which the intelligence forces, political methods, economic pressures and psychological warfare were used, so that the appropriate timing of the strike was chosen, and the internal factors played the most important role in determining it. Of course, this period permeated some rational flashes from which the possibility of understanding seemed, and the most important of which was the years of the American President John Kennedy’s rule, which involved a different view of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and it was through this vision that the Arab view was understood through a continuous dialogue with President Abdel Nasser It will also come in detail, as well as an attempt to assemble the Arab rank and restore the vitality of Arab solidarity through the formula of the Arab summits, which Abdel Nasser called in January 1964, and other things that we will return to again, but the conspiracy measure carried a design that far exceeds any interventions to stop it, and address any Emergency factors may hinder the attainment of his goals .. and to talk the rest.
- The situation in Egypt